David Otto, an independent counter-terrorism and organised crime expert and Director for Stepped In – Step Out UK Ltd, who has been sharing details of the inner workings of Boko Haram and ISWAP, tells GBENRO ADEOYE about the recent leadership shakeup in ISWAP, how insurgency can be defeated in Nigeria, among other issues regarding your recent reports about the execution of Islamic State’s West Africa Province’s commanders, including its governor in the Lake Chad area, Amir Baba Kaka, what do you think led to the leadership shakeup?


There have been distrust and suspicion amongst the top ISWAP leadership after the removal of Abu Musab Al-Barnawi and the killing of Mamman Nur. The genesis of the leadership chaos Boko Haram and ISWAP experience today is due to the changes at strategic and operational control after Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014 despite the resistance from its central leader, Abubakar Shekau.

The allegiance to ISIS threatened and shifted power from the hands of a centralised leadership of Boko Haram within Nigeria to one where the group’s activities and agenda are controlled by ISIS core leadership, even though ISIS’ plays no significant role in ISWAP’s day-to-day operational activities in northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. Baba Kaka (the governor of the Lake Chad/operational commander) was killed as a result of this leadership issue made worse by his inability to control his unit commanders and failure to put up any resistance against the Nigerian Army and regional Multinational Joint Task Force troops.



They appear to be well organised as they have a governor for the Lake Chad area, judge and so on, how would you describe their structure?

Under Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram operated a centralised structure with command and control from Shekau. He had a say in everything and every operation carried out by his commanders but after the 2016 split and formation of ISWAP under Al-Barnawi and Nur, the once centralised structure became decentralised, leading to loosely affiliated independent unit emerging – this had never been experienced before.

The JAS (Shekau) and ISWAP (Ba Lawan) factions still maintain a top leadership structure and the Shura council takes important decisions at the strategic level. But when it comes to operations and tactics, each unit adopts its own modus operandi, depending on who is commanding the unit. This is where decentralisation occurs but some level of information sharing still flows from unit commanders to strategic leaders. Not aligning operational activities with the Shura council and senior jihadist leadership has been cited by sources as one of the reasons why most of the top-level commanders have recently been replaced.

Old commanders have been arrested, detained, ostracised and brutally slaughtered. However, it is this level of disorganisation and decentralisation of activities that makes the jihadist group a nightmare for state and regional powers. With a centralised unit, any leaks are easy to deal with but when attacks are disorganised, it becomes practically impossible for state security service intelligence networks to know for certain which jihadist unit is planning what activity, where and when.

What is the current relationship between ISWAP and Boko Haram/Shekau?

Since the bitter ISWAP split in 2016 and the emergence of Yusuf’s son, Habib Al-Barnawi, Shekau’s JAS faction and ISWAP faction have literally been at each other’s throat. Power struggle and suspicion exist between these two groups with each group watching their backs against the other. The ISWAP’s much younger leaders consider Shakau as weak, old-fashioned and past his peak.

The killing of ISWAP strategist, Nur, and the overthrow of Al-Barnawi created more chaos between the two factions as Shekau was accused of orchestrating confusion within ISWAP leadership structure to regain influence. Efforts by some regional actors from Mali – Libya (AZWAJ) to reconcile both factions to fight for a common goal often do not last. At one point, Shekau was declared wanted by ISWAP. An audio released with Shekau screaming for mercy was confirmed by sources as the outcome of ISWAP declaring Shekau wanted dead or alive.

It is presumed you get your information from sources in their camps. How did you meet and court your source(s)?



Insurgencies are asymmetric warfare; it’s the peoples’ war and we often rely on sources with pre-existing relations with members of the group or outside the group. Terrorists also have friends, relatives, wives, neighbours, (and/or) siblings that they share things with on a daily basis. I pick things from there and often it’s the best source of information – HUMINT (human intelligence). Surprisingly, my experience is that insurgents like Boko Haram and ISWAP want people to know what they get up to on a daily basis and most of the time; they get some feeling of satisfaction when someone is aware of their activities outside the in-group.

Have you been to any of their camps or been invited there?

I have made several visits to the BAY states (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe) and the Lake Chad region for personal research. I don’t discuss the places I have been to, invited to or not been to unless it is relevant to a greater good for an existing but confidential peace plan. Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorists’ camps are always temporary and subject to change, especially when bombarded by the Nigerian Air Force or the Nigerian Army or regional MNJTF. You may be invited to one camp today but that camp could be in the rubble the next day if the Air Force had conducted a precision air strike.

From your interactions with your source(s) in ISWAP and/or Boko Haram or observations, what would you say they want or believe to be their current goal?

Their current goal is not to win but not to be completely eradicated. It sounds to me like survival until someone decides to surrender completely. Boko Haram and ISWAP use twisted ideology as a cover to exert power and control in the areas they operate within. Their daily activities and modus operandi show they are more of a group interested in power through deceptive means, (and) usurping (the roles of) religion for those who are ignorant enough.

The group relies on forced recruitment and terror tactics to sustain a false narrative of a caliphate in West Africa behind the scenes, using the mostly vulnerable population of local women, children and the old. These jihadist leaders are power mongers. Operationally, they aim to place the Nigerian Army at a defensive position and avoid being wiped off if the Army takes an offensive position. This aligns with the tactic of using small units to launch suicidal missions against super camps.

Do you think the recent leadership shakeup has strengthened or weakened the insurgents?

The fish rots from the head – leadership chaos means a group is not sure of its destination hence may lose focus and concentrate on consolidating power – this is what these groups are facing right now. Structurally, the jihadists are weak due to infighting, suspicions and splits. No single unit has the ability to match state response but from an asymmetric warfare perspective, the more chaotic it is, the harder it is to address. This does not mean the terrorists are powerful but they are rather too disorganised to be defeated on the battlefield.

The Nigerian government is fond of saying it has technically defeated Boko Haram and ISWAP by decimating and reducing them to only be capable of carrying out pockets of attacks, what can you say about this and their current strength?

Perhaps the Federal Government is using the term – technical defeat – to mean that Boko Haram/ISWAP no longer holds (or has the capacity to hold) and control the kind of territory and local government areas it did by 2015. It declared a caliphate in Gwoza in 2014 and burnt down Baga in 2015, killing about 2,000 people. But even if the Nigerian government succeeds to push Boko Haram/ISWAP out of Nigerian borders, it takes the full contribution of regional partners in Niger, Chad and Cameroon to reciprocate and avoid a cat and mouse tactic along the porous borders.

From a Nigerian angle, there is no doubt that Boko Haram still holds previously uninhabited territory in the Sambisa Forest – The Mandara Mountains and the Lake Chad axis. The role of the Nigerian army is to ensure that the Nigerian territory is not under the control of Boko Haram jihadists but this is difficult to achieve in such a vast and complex terrain. If and when they succeed to do so, then the job of getting rid of the physical presence of Boko Haram/ISWAP will be effectively successful. However, I don’t think the Nigerian government or indeed the Army should be discussing defeat or victory at this stage as there are pockets of Boko Haram units still hibernating within Nigerian territory with the capacity to cause damage and terrorise the local population.

To defeat Boko Haram requires more than the Nigerian military’s effectiveness – it is only one major success short of a technical defeat as I understand it. What you want to see is the effective contribution from every local stakeholder; inter-agency collaboration – Nigerian Army, Nigerian Air Force, Nigerian Navy, Nigeria Police, border agencies, state agencies, civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, regional, states and the local population. If they all engage with (one another) with sincerity and transparency, then one can begin to look for an appropriate term to describe the level of achievement made on and off the battlefield.

How would you rate the performance of the Nigerian government and its forces in the fight against insurgency so far?

You have to judge performance based on the enemy’s goals, terrain, personnel, resources, overall strategy and other key support mechanisms – both internal and external. To make a promise to defeat Boko Haram/ISWAP is easy, to achieve that promise is a matter that requires logistics, strategy and support at all levels. First, we must not forget that the Nigerian government and its security agencies are confronted by one of the most active insurgency groups and crises in the world – Boko Haram/ISWAP – in one of the most complex terrain – North-East, the Mandara Mountains and the Lake Chad basin states. This is an asymmetric warfare – the enemy can see you but you cannot differentiate the enemy from the innocent population.

Boko Haram/ISWAP aims to create an Islamic caliphate in the North-East, but they have not succeeded to do so since Gwoza was retaken after it declared it as the capital in 2014. This is a good performance indicator in asymmetric warfare when you consider that most of the local government areas have been liberated.

There is a need for more personnel to cover for the outstretched military deployed heavily in the North-East, North-West, Lake Chad axis, South-South, Middle Belt (North-Central) and the rest of the country in hot spots. Remember that the goal of the Nigerian government and the Army is to restore peace, not only in the North-East, but in the country as a whole.

The United States coalition defeated ISIS because of the global support that was channelled towards Iraq and Syria in Mosul and Raqqa – we have not seen the same level of boots on the ground in Nigeria to help defeat Boko Haram and ISWAP. The Nigerian government and suspicious regional states have been left to fight Boko Haram with meagre resources at all levels. Judging by these indicators, there are enough reasons to encourage the Nigerian government and regional partners to do more but they are performing better with the challenging support they receive from within and outside.

There appears to be more terrorist attacks recently in Borno, what do you think has been responsible for the renewed attacks? Have military forces gone weaker or the terrorists have become stronger?

These recent ‘ambush and escape’ attacks are a sign of desperation by Boko Haram and ISWAP; it demonstrates that the group is lashing out. It takes logistics to launch multiple attacks; it is expensive and involves loss of personnel. The attacks are a false flag aimed at keeping the military on the defensive position and not to engage in offensives. The new jihadist tactic of spreading across smaller units to launch attacks is a sign that these groups are growing weaker but trying to use these small attacks as propaganda and a show of growing strength. If Boko Haram and ISWAP aim to build a caliphate for its people to live in, then launching daily small attacks will not achieve this aim.

The strength and experience of the Nigerian military cannot be compared to Boko Haram and ISWAP put together but in an asymmetric warfare environment, the operational stakes are different hence daily operation is not straightforward if one has to compare strength for strength.

One would be wrong to say the Army has gone weaker but I see that battlefield fatigue is kicking in. It is clear that the Army has brought the war to a point where other sister agencies like the Nigeria Police and state authorities must step in to consolidate the space in areas where the Army has restored normalcy – this could be achieved through a phase by phase reconstruction and reintegration of civilian society.

The Nigerian government recently granted amnesty to some so-called repentant Boko Haram members and reportedly trained them, and this has been very controversial. What is your opinion of this?

Amnesty is one form of reducing the capacity of groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP but it must be done in the right way, and not to be seen as counter-productive. There must be proportionate punishments for those who join the process; (it should be) evidenced based and very case sensitive. This amnesty programme should not be seen as a reward but as a humane process of punishing criminals and terrorists, and a means to reintegrate them back into communities instead of eliminating them.

Communities must also see this as a benefit and should be prepared to receive genuinely repentant members. These communities should be given the opportunity to see what kind of process is given to these Boko Haram repentant members – this will build confidence and make the communities feel involved in the peace building process. Lastly, those vulnerable youths who have not joined Boko Haram should not be disadvantaged – they should be empowered and given better alternatives of living, else you will have a scenario of graduating 10 as part of the amnesty and making 20 to be recruited into Boko Haram.

Why do you think Nigeria has largely failed to defeat Boko Haram and ISWAP?

In comparison with other countries, COIN (counterinsurgency) strategy and in looking at the specific trajectory of Boko Haram/ISWAP, I believe the challenge of the Nigerian government is in the inability of all local, regional and international stakeholders to come together and support a victory strategy. The Federal Government can only defeat terrorism in Nigeria and beyond if everyone engages as a partner to end the war. At the moment, there is a false expectation that the Nigerian Army will do the job for Nigeria. If they made this promise, then I think it was an overpromise. It is the responsibility of all stakeholders.

What will you suggest as the solution to the problem of insurgency in Nigeria and around Chad and Niger areas? How can the terrorist organisations be defeated?

Complete defeat is not a short-term plan – it is a long-term commitment. It also requires a coordinated strategy from all local and regional stakeholders to tackle the jihadist ideology, recruitment, funding, source of income, and deny them the ability to hold and control territories, buy arms and ammunition, collect taxes and use propaganda to sell their stories. Everyone has to contribute – it is not a matter of abandoning the war in the hands of the government or the military and expecting victory. These entities can lead but they will not give victory or bring back peace to the ‘Home of Peace’.

A UN report already warned that terrorists might be planning terror attacks after “regrouping” during lockdown and that ISIS members might also try and weaponise COVID-19, do you think this could apply to insurgency in Nigeria?

As governments rejig on counterinsurgency strategies in Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, desperate terrorist groups will rejig their tactics. It is now necessary for national and regional states fighting ISIS and Al-Qaeda linked groups in a COVID-19 era to plan for the worst case scenario in order to respond without surprises.

In the wake of the Nigerian military intelligence-led ground and aerial offensives against ISIS and Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist strongholds in the Sambisa Forest, the fringes of the Lake Chad Basin, Mandara Mountains, North-East and recently in North-West Nigeria, there is a likelihood that weakened and struggling Boko Haram and ISWAP factions may choose to weaponise the coronavirus as a biological warfare tactic. The aim is to disable and slow down the operational capacity of the Nigerian Army, regional troops and other sister agencies involved in the front line.

It is possible that internally displaced persons’ camps could become the biggest and weakest targets for infection by Boko Haram and ISWAP jihadist groups to delay and frustrate any plans for relocation of displaced persons into their home communities – but also to target aid workers and delivery partners considered by jihadists as indirect and direct representatives of western civilisation. If COVID-19 is weaponised to hit these strategic targets through human or other forms of infection mechanism, front-line operational engagement and humanitarian efforts in the region will go into a coma.

There are several classified effective methods of designing and implementing a robust preventive response against CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive materials) counter-measure in hot spots with warning indicators. A special ear on the ground awareness framework is one proven methodology amongst other multi-agency approaches that could be assessed. If you see something, say something – this is the people’s war to win and all hands must be on deck.