20101018
ISS

Following more than two decades of failed interventions, African countries are being called upon to send more troops for a "surge" against Islamic militants in Somalia. Jakkie Cilliers, Henri Boshoff and Festus B Aboagye question this move.

The African Union's recent decision to call for a "troop surge" in Somalia raises a number of questions. One of these is why the AU should suddenly make this appeal after four years during which regional and international actors have largely ignored the Somali crisis. In addition, the effectiveness, sustainability and desired outcomes of such a surge should be questioned. Past experience has shown that this kind of international intervention can, on the contrary, serve to radicalise the situation and cause the conflict to spiral out of control.

The AU's decision to reinforce the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by almost 2,000 troops was no doubt heavily influenced by the Kampala suicide bombings on 11 July this year, less than a fortnight before the AU's bi-annual Heads of State summit in that city. The Somali jihadist group al- Shabaab claimed responsibility for the bombings, focusing world attention on the security situation in Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa.

But although the bombings may have galvanised Africa's political will on the strategic course of its intervention at such a critical juncture, it is by no means certain that the AU's member states will be so quick to contribute the required troops and capabilities to AMISOM after their delegations return to their respective capitals and reflect upon the Somali situation. The desired "troop surge" would increase the size of the force from the current level of around 6,300 (4 Ugandan and 3 Burundian battalions) to around the level of 8,000 that was previously mandated in 2007.

In line with its strategy of disengagement since the Somalia debacle of the mid-1990s, the international community - particularly the U.S. and the UK - continues to expect the AU and its member states to assume the burden of contributing troops. In the wake of this year's bombings, the U.S., which reportedly has already provided U.S. $200-million in support of the intervention in Somalia, promised to increase its funding and be consistent in its new commitment towards AU efforts in Somalia. Britain has also welcomed the increase in AU troop levels, calling on African states to provide the required forces as well as to intensify the training of Somalis themselves.

A dire security situation

According to AMISOM, the political and security situation in Mogadishu and Somalia remain dire, volatile and unpredictable. The realities on the ground in Mogadishu and Somalia present a number of scenarios ranging from civil war to localised insurgencies, in which Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam and other protagonists control portions of the central and southern regions, and large parts of Mogadishu. Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other temporary institutions, weak and lacking in national legitimacy, are actually in control of only a few square kilometres, including the presidential compound and other vital areas.

As for the precarious humanitarian situation, Refugees International has indicated that there are "approximately 1.5-million IDPs (internally displaced persons) and over 500,000 Somali refugees in neighbouring countries more than 3.6-million Somalis (40 percent of the population) are dependent on external assistance." This situation is expected to worsen given Al-Shabaab's destruction of relief stocks in recent times.

AMISOM's hands are tied

The AMISOM deployment and mandate implementation are threatened with failure because of their lack of attention to the key principles of peacekeeping established by the UN after decades of experience.

AMISOM's mandate is not achievable because, contrary to the requirements set out in 2000 by the Lakhdar Brahimi Panel, the force lacks the means and resources to do the job properly, and because there is a lack of substantive political support from within the region and internationally. Admittedly, since Western disengagement in the mid- 1990s, the AU has assumed much greater leadership and involvement on the continent. But in addition to advancing the peace process and attempting to find African solutions to African problems, Africa has been called upon to "spill blood" while the international community, particularly the West, simply donates money.

It is unreasonable to expect AMISOM, given the weakness of its mandate and lack of means and resources, to deliver anything resembling the conditions needed for peace in an increasingly challenging environment.

Even though the political rationale for the intervention is plausible, the AU should not throw caution to the wind and, against Brahimi's wisdom, apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors in Somalia historically have exhibited worst-case behaviour.

Furthermore, whatever is done in Somalia needs to be sustainable. It therefore appears tempting to suggest an AU/UN hybrid operation in Somalia (UNASOM), replicating the experiences in Sudan's Darfur in 2007.

Such an engagement, although likely to improve the mission level capabilities, would only be a cosmetic change unless it also confronted the huge command and control challenges and found a way of neutralising radicalised armed groups through dialogue more than use of force.

The danger here is that African forces, through various unsustainable and once-off enticements by individual partners, will be cajoled into Somalia and then starved of resources at the same time as donors blame AMISOM for inefficiency and negotiate among themselves for control of strategy through financial donations. AMISOM has not always inspired confidence and could be overwhelmed by demands to account for its numerous assistance and aid commitments.

In the current situation, the AMISOM operation, coupled with U.S., regional, UN and other international support, appears increasingly to serve as a magnet to "internationalise" the conflict, attracting foreign elements to the side of Al- Shabaab and other insurgents and, more pertinently, radicalising such armed groups - and the local population.

Past failures

It is important to also look at the merits of the surge in historical terms and the lessons that ought to be learned from the UN and international interventions in the 1990s. One important lesson from all the missions in Mogadishu is that the respective surges were accompanied by mandate revisions. What we are seeing now, however, is an insufficient surge without any review of the weak, insufficient peacekeeping mandate of AMISOM. What's more, its supporting organisation, the AU, does not have the management or logistic capacity for such an operation.

The Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in support of the TFG from December 2006 to January 2009 can be seen as another lesson that the AU and the international community are ignoring. Ethiopia had to drastically increase its force level - to as many as 20,000 troops - to deal with the ICU, but with limited success because of the lack of acceptance of the TFG and the fact that the population viewed the Ethiopian forces as foreign invaders. The question is, what has changed, and why would a surge in troops, to levels still less than those of previous interventions, now be able to stabilise the situation?

The danger in Somalia is that foreign invasion (which is how AMISOM is being portrayed by Al-Shabaab) could lead to increased terrorism. The more partners such as the USA get behind and are involved in Somalia, the worse the situation could become for the neighbouring countries as they eventually are left to face the brunt of the consequences of intervention. This then, is the first key ingredient of any effort in Somalia - real African leadership and ownership - which is different from African topdressing at the bidding of others.

Among the requirements of such an approach is control over clandestine U.S. and other military strikes and operations into Somalia from Camp Lemmonier in Djibouti, home to the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, and from navy ships offshore. The escalation of U.S. Predator drone strikes into Pakistan may be killing some terrorists, but they are also killing and maiming many locals, and, arguably, contributing more to inflaming passions than the military impact is worth. For all its money and resources, the single most important factor in Somalia must be to keep the Americans out, for they serve as a magnet, drawing international radicals from elsewhere. U.S. support is important, but it should be provided through mechanisms such as the UN Trust Fund that has been set up for AMISOM.

Towards a coherent Somalia strategy

The key problem in the approaches by the AU and the international community is that there is no peace to keep in Somalia. The desire of the U.S. and its allies for the AU and its forces to prop up and defend the TFG in Mogadishu is not a peacekeeping mission. It is also not a peace enforcement mission since there is no peace agreement to be "enforced', and the prospects of assembling a coalition large enough to provide stability in Somalia remains distant. Although 8,000 troops will certainly be better than 6,000, they will still be insufficient. Quite probably, a surge in troop deployment is not a realistic answer.

In Afghanistan, ISAF/NATO have deployed almost 120,000 troops. A similar troop-to-population ratio in Somalia would indicate a need for 40,700 soldiers. There has been some mention of a future AMISOM troop figure of 20,000 - two-and- a-half times the current ceiling - but even this target can be reached only with considerable international assistance or substantive Somali involvement. The Ethiopian military deployed anything from 15,000 to 20,000 troops in Somalia earlier for a specific military purpose and then withdrew, aware of the dangers of being trapped in an operation that was only going to get worse and still not achieve any durable security in Somalia.

The most important component of peace in Somalia remains missing - a legitimate all-inclusive political process that involves all key stakeholders, not only the TFG, Puntland and Somaliland, but also Al-Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam, who control large portions of Somalia. This is something that cannot be imposed from outside, as borne out by the experiences of the U.S.A., the British, the Canadians and the rest of the 40 members of the coalition in Afghanistan. Nineteen successive efforts at facilitating a peace process in Somalia have failed, largely because they have been imposed from outside, to suit groups of external interests and actors. Until such time as an appropriate internal process is initiated, the best AMISOM can do is to provide a fragile safe haven where people can seek refuge from time to time, and as a "green zone" for the TFG, to show that the existing approach is more attractive than the brutal and oppressive regime of Al-Shabaab.

To find a lasting solution to the Somalia problem will involve recognition on the part of the international community that the TFG does not appear to offer the best basis for reconciliation. In conjunction with the international community, the AU should embark on a more comprehensive political process that brings on board the other Somali "states" (Somaliland and Puntland), and all entities and institutions that have a stake in the future peace and stability of the country.

In seeking a lasting solution, the AU and the international community must recognise the critical regional dimensions to the Somali conflict revolving around the interests and concerns of others, especially those of Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is doubtful whether a lasting solution can be found without the fundamental involvement of these two countries. The challenge for the AU and the international community will be to prevail upon neighbouring countries whose populations include substantial numbers of Somalis to de-link their security concerns centring around ethnic Somali populations (Oromo and Ogaden) from the main conflict in Somalia. These countries should also be encouraged to find political solutions to their respective intrastate ethnic (Somali) tensions, while other neighbouring states such as Eritrea and Yemen are prevailed upon to guarantee not to inflame the conflict.

The Daily Nation

Al Shabaab during a graduation ceremony in Mogadishu.

With such political arrangements in place, the AMISOM peacekeeping mandate should be transferred to the UN, which has much more institutional expertise and is better resourced for such complex missions as is obviously required in Somalia. The mission should not be configured as a hybrid operation, and should be given a robust, humanitarian mandate to ensure security in support of emergent transitional institutions and assistance.

While it is tempting to argue for strategies such as the stabilisation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, these are inappropriate and neither practically nor politically feasible. It would be counterproductive to contextualise the Somali conflict principally within the "war on terror', even though that dimension cannot be ignored.

This analysis appears in the current issue of the-african.org, a bi-monthly publication of the Institute for Security Studies / Institut d'Études de Sécurité in Tshwane/Pretoria.