Air force
personnel |
11,140 |
[30th of 49] |
Air force personnel (per capita) |
0.025 per 100 population |
[35th of 49] |
Allies of World War I > Casualties as % of total personnel
|
16 %
|
[13th of 14] |
Allies of World War I > Killed in action |
9,463
|
[13th of 15] |
Allies of World War I > Personnel |
136,070 |
[13th of 15] |
Allies of World War I > Total casualties |
21,492
|
[13th of 15] |
Allies of World War I > Wounded in action |
12,029 |
[14th of 15] |
Armed forces
growth |
-40 |
[112nd of 132] |
Armed forces
personnel |
63,000 |
[55th of 166] |
Armed forces personnel (per capita) |
1.42071 per 1,000 people |
[120th of 166] |
Arms exports > constant 1990 US$ |
39,000,000 constant 1990 US$ |
[20th of 45] |
Arms exports > constant 1990 US$ (per capita) |
0.832 constant 1990 US$ per 1 |
[25th of 83] |
Arms imports > constant 1990 US$ |
606,000,000 constant 1990 US$ |
[8th of 100] |
Arms imports > constant 1990 US$ (per capita) |
12.924 constant 1990 US$ per c |
[23rd of 170] |
Army personnel |
54,300 |
[31st of 49] |
Army
personnel (per capita) |
1.22452 per 1,000 people |
[34th of 49] |
Branches
South African National Defense Force
(SANDF): South African Army, South African Navy (SAN), South African Air
Force (SAAF), Joint Operations Command, Military Intelligence, Military
Health Services |
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty > Signatures and Ratifications >
Ratification |
30 MAR 1999 |
|
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty > Signatures and Ratifications >
Signature |
24 SEP 1996 |
|
Conscription
No conscription.
|
Conventional arms exports |
$35,000,000.00 |
[24th of 40] |
Conventional arms exports (per $ GDP) |
0.071 per $1,000 |
[24th of 40] |
Conventional arms exports (per capita) |
0.789 per 1 population |
[27th of 40] |
Conventional arms imports |
$8,000,000.00 |
[75th of 85] |
Conventional arms imports (per $ GDP) |
0.016 per $1,000 |
[84th of 85] |
Conventional arms imports (per capita) |
0.18 per 1 population |
[83rd of 85] |
Employment in arms production |
40,000 |
[17th of 56] |
Employment in arms production (per capita) |
902.039 per 1 million people |
[28th of 56] |
expenditure > % of central government expenditure |
4.81 % |
[40th of 88] |
expenditure > % of GDP |
1.42 %
|
[69th of 145] |
expenditure > current LCU |
21697250000 |
|
Expenditures
|
1.7 % of GDP |
[48th of 87] |
Expenditures > Dollar figure |
$3,172,000,000.00 |
[11th of 111] |
Expenditures > Dollar figure (per $ GDP) |
$14.66 per 1,000 $ of GDP |
[49th of 111] |
Expenditures > Dollar figure (per capita) |
$68.42 per capita |
[23rd of 111] |
Expenditures > Percent of GDP |
1.7% |
[54th of 154] |
Manpower > Availability > Females |
11,501,537 |
[26th of 162] |
Manpower > Availability > Males |
11,622,507 |
[26th of 210] |
Manpower > Availability > Males age 15-49 |
11,865,300 |
[27th of 175] |
Manpower > Availability > Males age 15-49 |
11,924,500 |
[27th of 175] |
Manpower > Availability > Males age 15-49 (per capita)
|
0.257 per capita |
[85th of 175] |
Manpower > Availability > Males age 15-49 (per capita)
|
267.574 per 1,000 people |
[45th of 174] |
Manpower > Fit for military service > Females |
5,471,103 |
[38th of 162] |
Manpower > Fit for military service > Males |
6,042,498 |
[35th of 210] |
Manpower > Fit for military service > Males age 15-49
|
7,247,696 |
[28th of 174] |
Manpower > Fit for military service > Males age 15-49
|
7,211,080 |
[28th of 174] |
Manpower > Fit for military service > Males age 15-49 (per capita)
|
0.156 per capita |
[109th of 174] |
Manpower > Fit for military service > Males age 15-49 (per capita)
|
162.617 per 1,000 people |
[95th of 173] |
Manpower > Military age |
18 years of age |
|
Manpower > Reaching military age annually > Females
|
522,678 |
[19th of 226] |
Manpower > Reaching military age annually > Females (per capita)
|
10.714 per 1,000 people |
[75th of 225] |
Manpower > Reaching military age annually > Males
|
529,201 |
[20th of 226] |
Manpower > Reaching military age annually > Males (per capita)
|
10.848 per 1,000 people |
[81st of 225] |
Manpower available for military service > Females age 18-49
|
10,626,550
|
[17th of 120] |
Manpower available for military service > Females age 18-49 (per
capita) |
0.242 per capita |
[23rd of 120] |
Manpower available for military service > Males age 18-49
|
10,354,769
|
[19th of 164] |
Manpower available for military service > Males age 18-49 (per
capita) |
0.235 per capita |
[52nd of 164] |
Manpower fit for military service > Females age 18-49
|
4,609,071
|
[27th of 119] |
Manpower fit for military service > Females age 18-49 (per capita)
|
0.105 per capita |
[102nd of 119] |
Manpower fit for military service > Males age 18-49
|
4,927,757
|
[26th of 161] |
Manpower fit for military service > Males age 18-49 (per capita)
|
0.112 per capita |
[131st of 161] |
Manpower reaching military service age annually > Females age 18-49
|
506,078
|
[13th of 91] |
Manpower reaching military service age annually > Males age 18-49
|
512,407 |
[18th of 157] |
Naval officer ranks > Flag Officers > OF-6
Rear Admiral (Junior Grade)(in English)
Skout-Admiraal (JR) (in Afrikaans) |
Naval officer ranks > Flag Officers > OF-7
Rear Admiral (in English)
Skout-Admiraal (in Afrikaans) |
Naval officer ranks > Flag Officers > OF-8
Vice Admiral (in English)
Vise-Admiraal (in Afrikaans) |
Naval officer ranks > Flag Officers > OF-9
Admiral (in English)
Admiraal (in Afrikaans) |
Naval officer ranks > Other officers > OF-2 |
Lieutenant
Luitenant |
|
Naval officer ranks > Other officers > OF-3
Lieutenant Commander
Luitenant-Kommandeur |
Naval officer ranks > Other officers > OF-4 |
Commander
Kommandeur |
|
Naval officer ranks > Other officers > OF-5 |
Captain
Kaptein |
|
Navy personnel |
8,000 |
[31st of 49] |
Navy
personnel (per capita) |
0.180408 per 1,000 people |
[36th of 49] |
Note
with the end of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule, former
military, black homelands forces, and ex-opposition forces were
integrated into the South African National Defense Force (SANDF); as of
2003 the integration process was considered complete |
personnel
|
56,000 |
[68th of 170] |
personnel (per capita) |
1.194 per 1,000 people |
[142nd of 171] |
personnel > % of total labor force |
0.29 % |
[141st of 168] |
Service age and obligation
18 years of age for voluntary military service |
US military
exports |
$1,794.00 thousand |
[34th of 109] |
US military exports (per capita) |
$0.04 thousand per 1,000 peopl |
[78th of 109] |
Weapon holdings |
2,671,000 |
[31st of 137] |
Weapon holdings (per capita) |
60,233.6 per 1 million people |
[69th of 137] |
WMD > Biological
South Africa’s biological weapons program was one of the two principal
components of its covert state-sponsored CBW program,
codenamed Project Coast (later Project Jota). Personnel associated with
Coast have characterized it as the most sophisticated program of its
type outside of the former Soviet Union, but international CBW experts
generally consider it to have been considerably less advanced from a
scientific standpoint. Although ostensibly created entirely for
defensive purposes, since government and Cuban military forces in Angola
were reportedly equipped for and planning to use—if not already using—CW
agents against the South African Defence Force (SADF), from the outset
the program also had offensive features and capabilities. The
apartheid-era South African government viewed itself as the target of a
“total onslaught” by Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas or regimes in
neighboring states and black nationalists at home, and to meet this
all-encompassing “red-black danger” it was apparently willing to use
almost any means at its disposal to defend itself. It was in this highly
charged political and military context, which precipitated a “bunker” or
“laager” mentality, that Coast was secretly initiated in 1981 under the
aegis of the SADF Special Forces. The chief facility for researching,
producing, and testing BW agents and lethal toxic chemicals was a
military front company called Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, located
north of Pretoria, and other facilities were established to develop
protective clothing and manufacture exotic assassination devices.
Project Officer Dr. Wouter Basson also set up an elaborate network of
procurement and financial front companies overseas. During its existence
Coast scientists tested or developed a wide range of harmful BW agents,
including Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, Vibrio cholerae,
Clostridium perfringens, plague bacteria, and salmonella bacteria. Some
of these pathogens were probably used to assassinate individual “enemies
of the state,” and it is alleged that both anthrax bacteria and V.
cholerae were each employed on at least one occasion to infect larger
populations. The CBW program was officially dismantled in 1993, in the
midst of a liberalizing transformation of the regime. There are
indications, however, that certain personnel who were intimately
involved in the program, including Basson, may have provided technical
knowledge, equipment, or materials to “rogue regimes” such as Libya, to
foreign intelligence personnel, to unscrupulous black marketers
trafficking in dangerous weapons, and perhaps also—if certain
journalists can be believed—to elements of a shadowy international
network of right-wing extremists. These claims have yet to be fully
investigated, much less verified. The extent to which various foreign
governments, military establishments, and intelligence agencies secretly
monitored or covertly assisted in the development of the program
likewise remains an open question. |
WMD > Chemical
South Africa’s chemical warfare program was one of the two principal
components of its covert state-sponsored CBW program, codenamed Project
Coast (later Project Jota). Personnel associated with Coast have
characterized it as the most sophisticated program of its type outside
of the former Soviet Union, but international CBW experts generally
consider it to have been considerably less advanced from a scientific
standpoint. Although ostensibly created entirely for defensive purposes,
since government and Cuban military forces in Angola were reportedly
equipped for and planning to use—if not already using—CW agents against
the South African Defence Force (SADF), from the outset the program also
had offensive features and capabilities. The apartheid-era South African
government viewed itself as the target of a “total onslaught” by
Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas or regimes in neighboring states and
black nationalists at home, and to meet this all-encompassing “red-black
danger” it was apparently willing to use almost any means at its
disposal to defend itself. It was in this highly charged political and
military context, which precipitated a “bunker” or “laager” mentality,
that Coast was secretly initiated in 1981 under the aegis of the SADF
Special Forces. The chief facility for researching and producing CW
agents was a military front company called Delta G Scientific, located
between Johannesburg and Pretoria, and several other facilities were set
up to develop protective clothing, manufacture exotic assassination
devices, and “weaponize” irritants (Riot Control Agents such as CS and
CR) and incapacitants by placing them in artillery shells, mortar bombs,
and grenades. Project Officer Dr. Wouter Basson also set up an elaborate
network of procurement and financial front companies overseas. During
its existence Coast scientists tested and developed both small
quantities of well-known CW agents (including mustard agent, sarin,
tabun, BZ, and perhaps VX) and a host of lethal, hard-to-trace toxic
chemicals. Several of these latter, above all the toxic
organophosphates, were almost certainly employed to assassinate
individual “enemies of the state.” Certain CW facilities also carried
out research on the suitability of using illegal drugs such as
methaqualone (“Quaaludes”), MDMA (“Ecstasy”), LSD, marijuana extract
(tetrahydrocannibol), and cocaine as incapacitating “calmatives,” but
some of these illegal drugs may have ended up being sold for a profit.
The CBW program was officially dismantled in 1993, in the midst of a
liberalizing transformation of the regime. There are indications,
however, that certain personnel who were intimately involved in the
program, including Basson, may have provided technical knowledge,
equipment, or materials to “rogue regimes” such as Libya, to foreign
intelligence personnel, to unscrupulous black marketers trafficking in
dangerous weapons, and perhaps also—if certain journalists can be
believed—to elements of a shadowy international network of right-wing
extremists. These claims have yet to be fully investigated, much less
verified. The extent to which various foreign governments, military
establishments, and intelligence agencies secretly monitored or covertly
assisted in the development of the program likewise remains an open
question. |
WMD > Missile
It is not clear when South Africa began ballistic missile-related
efforts, but reportedly by the mid-1980s, some missile infrastructure
existed in the country. It appears that Israel collaborated with South
Africa in development of this program, but the nature and extent of this
relationship is unknown. Following a July 1989 flight-test of what
Pretoria described as a “booster rocket” in a space-launch program, U.S.
intelligence noted striking similarities between this system and
Israel’s intermediate-range Jericho-2 ballistic missile. Facing U.S.
opposition to missile proliferation and the end of its apartheid
government, South Africa abandoned its missile and space launch programs
in 1991 and dismantled associated facilities under international
observation. South Africa became a member of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995. |
WMD > Nuclear
In the 1960s, South Africa began to explore the technical utility of
"peaceful nuclear explosions" for mining and engineering purposes. In
1973, then Prime Minister Johannes Vorster approved a program to develop
a limited nuclear deterrent capability. Ultimately, South Africa
manufactured six air-deliverable nuclear weapons of the "gun-type"
design. In parallel with decisions to end apartheid, the government
halted the bomb program in 1989 and dismantled existing weapons and
associated production equipment. South Africa acceded to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon
state in 1991, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors
subsequently verified the completeness of its nuclear dismantlement.
South Africa joined the Zangger Committee in 1994 and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group in 1995. South Africa was instrumental in winning
indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and played a leading role in
successful conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference as a member of
the "New Agenda Coalition" that also included Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden. More recently, South Africa began
working more closely with the IAEA in 2004, in order to monitor
international smuggling of nuclear weapons materials, after
investigations of a South African businessman exposed connections to the
A.Q. Khan network. In 2004, there was also ample discussion concerning
South Africa’s dwindling coal reserves and its need for additional
nuclear power generation. |
WMD > Overview
South Africa's nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs
reflected perceptions of internal and external threats stemming from its
former government's policy of apartheid, as well as the country's
advanced state of technical development. Pretoria developed nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles but relinquished these armaments in the
early 1990s. The apartheid government also undertook a chemical and
biological weapons (CBW) defense program, which reportedly also included
offensive research and use of CBW agents against opponents of that
government. While the proliferation legacies of South Africa's nuclear
and missile programs were effectively resolved through verified
disarmament measures that won international acclaim, dismantlement of
the country's CBW capabilities was not verified to a comparable degree
of certainty. The post-apartheid government of South Africa implemented
its nonproliferation and disarmament policy through the
Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (No. 87 of 1993) to
control the transfer of sensitive items and technologies. South Africa
is the first and, to date, only country to build a nuclear arsenal, and
then voluntarily dismantle its entire nuclear weapons program. The South
African experience demonstrates that at least under some conditions,
unilateral disarmament is not only possible, but can improve a nation’s
security. |