Côte d'Ivoire is on the brink of civil war. Its president since 2000, Laurent Gbagbo, is refusing to cede power to Allasane Ouattara, the putative winner of elections last November, and is using the instruments of state to crush his supporters.

As clashes between forces loyal to each of the parties intensify, the African Union has attempted to resolve the impasse by proposing that the rivals share power in a Government of National Unity – popularly referred to as a GNU. Such governments have been formed in a number of countries across the continent to resolve deadlocks between incumbents and popular challengers.

It may be an academic exercise to look at GNUs on the continent, since Gbagbo has flatly refused the option. But, as some African analysts point out, leaders such as Kenya's Mwai Kibaki, initially refused to enter them but after some time relented and, although Kenya's alliance is still fraught with dissension, at least so far the political tensions have not deteriorated into violence.

So what is the record of GNUs in Africa? Can they play a useful role in easing transitions from deeply-entrenched regimes to newly-elected leaders, or are they simply a mechanism which enables dictators to cling to power when they have lost their mandate?

It depends on how you measure it and who is doing the measuring. David Zounmenou of the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria argues that most of what have been described as GNUs have actually been "strategies to move out of conflict," as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sudan, Mozambique and Angola. And he argues that the manner of their adoption has given them a negative connotation. "If the legitimacy of an election is contested," he says, "you cannot talk about democracy."

South African political analyst Adam Habib argues that the "great success story" of GNUs was South Africa, where there was no civil war in the classic sense, and where in 1994 Nelson Mandela's African National Congress overwhelmingly won an undisputed election and the National Party, the rulers of the minority white regime, joined the government because, as Habib put it: "They felt they had a stake—namely 20 or more seats in the National Assembly and one or more Cabinet portfolios."

Mandela and the ANC also invited other opposition parties into the government. Although two years later, the National Party "changed its mind" and left government (though other opposition parties remained), Habib says that the arrangement facilitated a breakthrough that avoided violence and ensured a smooth transition.

Habib argues that the issue was and remains "under what conditions do you temper justice?" In his view, the South African experience demonstrates that "if you can temper justice for peace, then it's worth it. But you can only temper justice if you make progress."

But Steven Friedman, the director of the Johannesburg-based Center for the Study for Democracy, disagrees with Habib on the South African experience and GNUs in general. He insists that "what power sharing tends to be is second chances for defeated minorities," adding, "It doesn't work."

Habib argues that what was critical in the change of government in South Africa was that no sooner had the Mandela-led government come to power than it took control of the armed forces, a critical variable in any power-sharing deal. Former combatants fighting against the white regime were integrated into the armed forces, with minimal conflict. In Côte d'Ivoire, Gbagbo retains control of the military, buttressing his intransigence.

The same is true in Zimbabwe, where after losing an election in 2008, Robert Mugabe eventually agreed to a GNU but retained control of what South African analyst Aishee Kajee calls "the machinery of the repressive state"—the military, the police and the security apparatus. While Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change secured the finance ministry, there are raging battles between the finance minister, Tendai Biti, and Mugabe's Zanu-PF party over civil servants' salaries and millions of missing dollars from diamond sales.

Kajee points to other failures of the Zimbabwe GNU, including a refusal to honor agreements over government positions — in particular Mugabe's refusal to swear in the deputy agriculture minister, who has been arrested and otherwise harassed and has fled to South Africa. Kajee says the apparatus of government is "hamstrung" because of differences between the two sides. In the last few days, Tsvangirai has declared the GNU "dysfunctional" and called for a "divorce" following the detention of a senior member of his party.

In Kenya, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga formed what Kenyans call "the grand coalition" after widespread violence followed the disputed 2007 election. Kibaki initially refused to accept a GNU, but finally agreed after the sustained intervention of a team led by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

However, deep divisions remain, making it an uneasy coalition plagued by power struggles and disagreements over issues as such Odinga's powers and most recently the venue for the trial of six leaders charged by the International Criminal Court with crimes arising from the post-election violence.

Last year, analyst Rose Mwebeza of the Nairobi office of the Institute for Security Studies argued that the Kenyan GNU "is about to unravel," and that its problems "further highlight the inadequacies of power sharing agreements and the challenges they pose in their implementation on the African continent."

She went on to ask: "Do power sharing arrangements such as the one for the Kenyan coalition government really serve any meaningful purpose beyond creating positions of power to placate and reward warring political opponents? Can power sharing arrangements really lead to the creation of a function[ing] government that can deliver peace and development for the people?"

Answering, she argued: "The lessons from the Kenyan experience would suggest otherwise and point to the grim reality that what Kenya has, like all other African governments in similar power-sharing arrangements, is a fare that can unravel at any time at the cost and peril of ordinary people."

Kajee agrees, citing Zimbabwe: "This type of non-working Government of National Unity sets a very unfortunate precedent elsewhere on the continent, where leaders and governments and administrations that have been in power long beyond their 'sell-by date' continue to believe they can retain power because they feel their colleagues in the multilateral system—the African Union—will continue to let them stay in power."

David Zounmenou says that if an administration's legitimacy is contested, "you cannot talk about democracy. You cannot compromise that aspect of the democratic process." Yet he believes the establishment of GNUs shows that "Africans have realized you respect the will of the people." He singles out the president of Mali, Amadou Toumani Touré, who has instituted a government position for the parliamentary opposition leader to help him or her learn how to govern.

If Gbagbo does in time agree to a GNU in Côte d'Ivoire, given the history of GNUs on the continent, will it resolve anything?

John Stremlau, vice president for peace programs at The Carter Center, based in Atlanta, Georgia in the United States, believes GNUs "can be very helpful in the consolidation of peace agreements following civil strife." And he says he expects to see a GNU emerge in Côte d'Ivoire.

But he agrees with other analysts in saying: "The key issue, of course, is: who is in charge? If the fellow who received the majority of votes in an election is deemed credible, with the resulting count in this case validated by the UN, then fine.

"The problem comes when the GNUs become a way for still powerful incumbents to frustrate the popular will, as in Zimbabwe."

Stremlau says there is not as long a history of political compromises producing less than ideal democratic outcomes, which nevertheless prove enduring and legitimate.

He goes on to point to the founding fathers of the United States, who came up with a unifying formula, which he recalls was "extremely cruel" to black people – who were deemed to be only three-fifths of a person – and rewarded small members of the federation with privileges standing contrary to the principle of one person, one vote – the standard hallmark of democracy. Decades went by before the civil rights movement of the 1960s led to laws that righted that wrong.

Echoing the ISS's Zounmenou, Stremlau says: "Sovereignty resides in the people, not the leader. If that principle is upheld, then a GNU can be a bridge to sustainable peace and democratic development."

Statement of disclosure: Charlayne Hunter-Gault is a member of the board of trustees of the Carter Center, which employs Stremlau.