The Egyptian image is becoming clearer day after day waiting for the moment of announcing the results of the presidential elections, which would settle the final image of Egypt’s new political destination after the transformative revolution wanted by the Egyptians. In fact, this revolution should maintain its transformative description and should not be just exceptional passing events, as long as they are finished the situation returns back to its previous manner.
The Egyptian street is divided into two approaches; each contains variations that differ among themselves in terms of militancy and moderation. Yet, despite the great diversity of the spectra of the Egyptian people, the two most influential forces in Egypt are the Islamic force and the liberal force, without diminishing the importance and the right of the other religious, intellectual and ethnic minority groups in the political life.
The Islamic force is divided among itself into two large movements, in which the Muslim Brotherhood forms the largest force and the second is the Salafist movement, which is the strictest part.
The liberal force contains many variations of secular, national and Nasserite parties that have had the most prominent role in the Egyptian political life positively and negatively at the stage of harassing and banning the Islamic force exerted by the former regime.
Because of the dependency of the regime of Hosni Mubarak fully on the Western countries, they are considered, especially the United States, the most part knowledgeable of the Egyptian scene, for they worked through their intelligence services all through the previous stage on interfering in the smallest Egyptian political daily details in favor of their interests and to preserve the security of the Zionist entity.
However, after the U.S. administration was shocked with the Egyptian revolution, which brought down its strongest ally in the region, it worked to harness its full influence and alliances to that to divert the route of the revolution and to keep it away from its transformative goals and to maintain the authority of the former regime. Today, it is working on re-forming a new political regime that would keep the policies of the old regime but with new personalities and faces. It has began to prepare for the presidential elections that form a primary joint in shaping the new face of the Egyptian policy, because the Constitution has granted the presidential seat great powers.
It is normal that the U.S. administration tends to the liberal street more than the Islamic one. Therefore, with the start of the nominations for the presidential elections, it started to support the candidate Amro Moussa, who has a political history in the Arab League that shows that he is an ally and an obedient man implementing it orders.
On the other hand, the U.S. administration knows that the Islamists make up the most disciplined force in the Egyptian street, and that if the Islamic interests were totally harmonized and united on a consensus candidate among them, it would become easy for them to ensure the presidency in the first round of the elections. Thus, the American decision was to squash the Islamic votes among several candidates so that to lose the ability to deliver an Islamist president.
In order to implement this decision, the U.S. administration asked Saudi Arabia, which is considered the main reference for the Salafist movement in the Arab world, to ask the Salafists in Egypt in turn to nominate Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, who is separated from the group, in order to provoke the anger of the Muslim Brotherhood, who have initiated quickly to nominate Mohamed Morsi in opposition to Abul Fotouh.
The nomination of Abul Fotouh by the Salafis is a smart blow inflicted by the American administration, because he causes differences between the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood and between the formations of each as well. The Salafists want to comply with the request of Saudi Arabia at a time when some of them see that the nomination of a former member of the Brotherhood by them is as if minimizing the significance of their cadres who are able to run the presidential race. At the same time, Abul Fotouh is still having some supporters affiliated to the Brotherhood who are able to provoke confusion among the masses and the leaders of the group.
Up to this moment, communication still exists between the Islamic force in a difficult and almost impossible attempt to reach an agreement on a joint candidate and to withdraw the other candidates in his favor in light of the Saudi and Western pressure. Also, the Muslim Brotherhood, according to some sources close to them, are continuing to nominate Mohamed Morsi until the moment they feel that his chances of success are almost zero, and only then they would hastily withdraw him and support the middle Islamic candidate Mohamed Salim Al-Awa to raise the status of defeat if he failed to win because he is an unorganized personality in their ranks.
On the liberal side, the chances of Amro Moussa to succeed are increasing in light of the Islamic dispute and disintegration, yet the Nasserite candidate Hamdeen Sabahi is sparking. He has great popularity and is loved by the Egyptians because of his history of struggle in the face of the regime of Hosni Mubarak and standing besides the Palestinian cause.
The date of the first round of the presidential elections is approaching, and if the Islamic force kept its dispute - which is probably going to happen- the strong competition will be limited between 4 candidates Amro Moussa (the candidate of the United States and Israel), Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh (the candidate of Saudi Arabia to tear the Islamists up), Hamdeen Sabahi (the candidate of the national Nasserites), and Mohamed Morsi, or Muhammad Salim Al-Awa (the Brotherhood candidate, the one they choose).
Therefore, it is expected that the results of the first round of elections, which will carry two candidates to compete in the second round on the Presidential seat and its deputy, would have 4 possibilities, and they are as follows:
1- The success of Mohamed Morsi with Hamdeen Sabahi causes the failure of the American-Israeli policy in Egypt and the re-formation of a new national Egyptian regime that saves the national interests and stands beside the central issue of Palestine.
2- The success of Mohammed Morsi and Amro Moussa causes a balance between the Western will and the Egyptian national will awaiting the outcome of the second round, which would give the odds for those who can deliver their candidate to the Presidential seat.
3- The success of Hamdeen Sabahi and Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh causes a balance between the Saudi will, the ally of the Americans, and the Egyptian national will, awaiting the outcome of the second round.
4- The success of Amro Moussa and Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh is the worst possibility for the Egyptians, who would return to the regime of Hosni Mubarak but with new faces that would throw their revolution in the trash.
Hence, no one can force the Egyptians to choose a particular candidate because when they stand behind the curtain, every Egyptian would be alone with his/her national conscience being only seen by God, who is controlling and is the source of strength.
Source: Islam Times