The seizure of Goma by the Mouvement du 23 mars rebels on 20 November has dangerously weakened the regime of President Joseph Kabila Kabange. Backed by Rwanda and Uganda, M23’s brutal campaign in eastern Congo threatens Kinshasa both by exposing the government’s inability to protect the public and by forming opportunistic alliances with other oppositionists. On 28 November, at least some M23 commanders were responding to international pressure to withdraw from Goma but they were tying this to negotiating conditions. Some commanders said they were prepared to pull their troops back to 30 kilometres outside Goma but continued to maintain a threatening posture. There are also credible reports that M23 forces have stolen over US$50 million from the city’s branch of the Banque centrale du Congo.

However M23 plays the negotiations, there seems little prospect of Kabila recovering his political authority in the east or indeed, anywhere else in the country. This is his first major crisis since the death of his political and business advisor Augustin Katumba Mwanke (AC Vol 53 No 11, A government of few talents). No official has been able to match Katumba’s ability to cajole, coopt and sometimes crush Kabila’s political opponents. Instead, Kabila is under siege from politicians within his camp and from oppositionists furious at Congo’s inability to defend its own territory.

Congo-K

Some are nationalists genuinely angry about the state of the government and army but others are provincial and Territorial Administration officials (running customs and tax departments) exploiting the crisis to boost their local income and power-base. This will further weaken Kinshasa’s grip on the state and political developments.

Kabila is caught between the nationalists’ angry demands and groups with which M23 has built alliances. These include militias such as the Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri under ‘Cobra’ Matata Banaloki, and General Kakule Sikule ‘Lafontaine’ who ran a local ‘community defence’ militia, the Patriotes résistants congolais (Pareco, AC Vol 51 No 2, Problems on the home front & Vol 53 No 9, Wanted – the Terminator). These militias could reinforce M23’s push southwards and westwards, and back its attempts to establish local administrations.

‘If not Kabila, then who?’
M23’s rapid progress towards Bukavu in this week was undoubtedly helped by other opposition groups. What they all have in common, beyond distrust of the government, is far less clear. This latest breakdown in government control will probably provoke more instability and political in-fighting. When people in Kinshasa ask, ‘If not Kabila, then who?’ a long pause usually follows. Partisans of the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social argue that their presidential candidate, Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, was the real winner of last November’s election and should take over.

Yet there’s no sign that Tshisekedi could win over the inchoate military and he has so far failed to capitalise on his rival’s political woes. The last time he tried to exploit a rebellion in the east, the consequences were fairly disastrous for him. Even Kabila’s former ally Vital Kamerhe, who won strong support from Western governments, has failed to make himself heard.

The disarray in Kinshasa is sending shock waves towards Kabila’s main business partners, such as Israel’s Dan Gertler, Swiss-based Glencore and the Eurasian National Resources Corporation who face growing international criticism of the opacity of their commercial operations in Congo. We hear that Glencore’s would-be merger partner, Xstrata, has privately raised concerns about the reputational risk of its mining deals in Congo. Should Kabila fall, that reputational risk would escalate into a massive financial risk.

There are obvious parallels between the current war and the rebellions of 1996 and 1998: the first led to the ousting of President Mobutu Sese Seko within a year; the second led to a succession of political crises resulting in the assassination of Mobutu’s successor, Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Now his son Joseph is in the gunsights of eastern rebels. Although international pressure should be sufficient to prevent Uganda and Rwanda from joining M23 in a military drive on Kinshasa, Kabila lacks the domestic support to organise a credible fightback.

Riots in Bunia and Bukavu
On 19 November, 103 members of parliament and senators supported a declaration that Kabila had not tried to build a national army during his eleven years in office and that his tolerance of Rwanda and Uganda bordered on ‘high treason’. On 20 and 21 November, nine people died in riots in Kisangani, Bukavu and Bunia, as people vented their anger about Kabila’s failure to take on the invaders. All these towns were recorded as voting for him in the 2011 election.

Kabila initially refused to negotiate directly with the rebels but changed tack after prodding from the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, which held a summit in Kampala on 24 November. On paper, the ICGLR offers independent mediation but the real powers behind it, Rwanda and Uganda, are also backing M23. On 26 November, M23’s military leader, Brigadier Gen. Sultani Makenga, flew to Kampala to meet Kabila and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. The next day, Uganda’s Defence Minister, Gen. Aronda Nyakairima, announced that M23 would pull out of Goma.

A central problem for Kabila is the nature of M23’s demands. If he negotiates command positions in the national army with the rebels and the posting of key units and commanders, there will be little chance of forging a credible national army. The commander of ground forces, Gen. Gabriel Amisi Kumba (‘Tango-Four’), was suspended two days after his troops lost Goma. The United Nations Panel of Experts had accused him of procuring and selling ammunition and weapons to illegal armed groups, including the notorious militia Raia Mutomboki and their enemies the Nyatura, as well as to poachers (AC Vol 53 No 23, Expert opinions).

European diplomats have for some time pressured Kabila to take action against Amisi, we hear. Amisi has been ‘running his own empire’ inside Congo-K, said one source. He is a former commander with the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), the last group to take Goma. He has close ties to the Kigali regime. Lieutenant Gen. François Olenga Tete has assumed Amisi’s duties during his suspension and has immediately begun attempting to instil some order among the unruly troops that have retreated to Minova in South Kivu (AC Vol 44 No 24, Peace or bust). Reports emerged from Minova of army soldiers looting, shooting and raping. Since Olenga arrived, at least two soldiers have apparently been shot for indiscipline. He acknowledged that he had had ‘traitors’ shot and was trying to rally the troops.

Kabila has not grasped the severity of the crisis unfolding in the east. His circle of advisors tends only to give him good news and there is, we understand, a belief that removing M23 from Goma will solve all the government’s problems. This could prove to be dangerously deluded.

Source: www.africa-confidential.com